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THE INDIVIDUAL, HEALTH HAZARDOUS
LIFESTYLES, DISEASE AND LIABILITY
Amy Darby*
"Who said the health service could not resolve its finding crisis?
Britain's cardiac surgeons have come up with a solution that will
solve the government's problems at the stroke: the withdrawal of
treatment for self-inflicted sickness. Surgeons at two separate
medical centres were reported last week to have withdrawn non-
urgent coronary bypass operations from patients who were
refusing to give up smoking. "'
INTRODUCTION
The health care system of the United States is in disarray' and President
Clinton's promise for a national health plan never came to fruition.3
'Managing Editor, DEPAUL JOURNAL OF HEALTH CARE LAW. B.S.N., University of
Michigan, 1991; M.A., Loyola University- Chicago, 1997; J.D. (Cand.), DePaul University
College of Law, 2000.
'Malolm Dean, London Perspective: Self-InflictedRationing, 341 THE L.IcET 1525,1525
(1993) (attributing the surgeons' actions to "limited NHS (national health system] rezources, self-
inflicted damage by smokers, an increased failure rate with smokers, and the fact that treating
smokers meant resources were being denied to non-smokers"). See also K.C. Calman, TheEthics
ofAllocation of Scarce Health Care Resources: A View From the Centre, 20 J. MED. ETHICS 71,
73 (1993) (evaluating the allocation of resources in Britain, author states "l]ifestyle, notably m
relation to cigarette smoking has been suggested as a factor which can be u.ed in determining
which patients should be treated, and what resources should allocated to them").
2LawrenceO. Gostin,SecuringfHealth orJust Health Care? The ffect oftheHealth Care
System OnThe Health ofAmerica, 39 ST. Louis U. L.J. 7,43 (1995)[hereinafter Gotm, Sccuring
Health] (citing President Bill Clinton, The State of the Union Address [Jan. 25, 1994], in WAsH.
POST. Jan. 26, 1994, at A12. "I know there are people here who say there's no health care cni:.
.... Tell it to the 58 million Americans who have no coverage at all for some time each year. Tell
it to the 81 million Americans with... preexisting conditions .... Tell it to the small busineszes
burdened by skyrocketing costs of insurance.... Or tell it to the 76 percent of insured Americans,
three out of four whose policies have lifetime limits, and that means they can find themzel%.e3
without any coverage at all when they need it the most").
3See Walter E. Schuler, The ERISA Pre-Emption Narrows: Analysts of Nev Yarl: State
Conference of Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans v. Travelers Insurance Company and Its Impact
on State Regulation of Health Care, 40 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 783, 783 (1996).
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Thirty-seven million Americans are without health care,4 neonatal
mortality is comparable to third world countries, 5 health care costs now
exceed fourteen percent of the gross national product,6 and life expectancy
is lagging behind other developed countrieA.7 Based on these facts it is no
surprise that issues related to cost containment are continually surfacing.
Avenues for cost reductions are constantly being explored and modified.8
Within this emerging system individuals, corporations, insurance
companies, and hospitals are vying to shift the blame9 and the medical
costs to some other source. ' As a result, there is a prevalent trend
connecting the individual, disease, and responsibility." Lifestyles and
behaviors are being promoted as an individual's choice which one should
modify in order to prevent disease.'2 For almost two decades 3 discussions
4Schuler, supra note 3, at 783.
5See Gostin, SecuringHealth, supra note 2, at 24 (explaining that "[t]he United States ranks
below average among economically developed countries on currently used measures such as infant
mortality and low birth weight babies, life expectancy, and years of health life as a proportion of
life expectancy") (citing U.S. PUBLIC HEALTH SERV., U.S. DEP'TOFHEALTH&HUMANSERVICES,
HEALTH PEOPLE 2000: NAT'L HEALTH PROMOTION & DISEASE PREVENTION OBJECTIONS 6, 9
(1991)). See also Emily Friedman, The Uninsured: From Dilemma to Crisis, 265 JAMA 2491,
2495 (1991) (noting that "[m]any of our health status indicators are lagging or beginning to lag
behind those in the rest of the developed world-and, indeed, in some of the Third World").
6Barbara Sande Dimmitt, The State of Health Care In America, 1996 BUS. AND HEALTH
MAG. 6, 6. See Gostin, Securing Health, supra note 2, at 25 ("[T]he expenditure on health care
in the United States represents approximately 14 percent of the nation's gross domestic product.
Health care expenditures are expected to reach $1.7 trillion, between 16 and 18 percent of the
gross domestic product, by the end of the decade if effective controls are not instituted").
7Gostin, SecuringHealth, supra note 2, at 25 (citing OFFICEOFTECHNOLOGYASSESSMENT,
U.S. CONGRESS, UNDERSTANDING ESTIMATES OF NATIONAL HEALTH EXPENDITURES UNDER
HEALTH REFORM, 1-3 (1994); Sally T. Sonnenfeld et al., Projections of National Health
Expenditures Through the Year 2000, HEALTH CARE FIN. REV., Fall 1991, at 1, 4, 22;
CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE, PROJECTIONS OFNATIONAL HEALTH EXPENDITURES 14 (table)
(1992)).
1E. HAAvi MORREIM, BALANCING ACT: THE NEw MEDICAL ETHICS OF MEDICINE'S NEW
ECONOMiCS 13-38 (1995).
9See Robert L. Schwartz, Lifestyle, Health Status, and Distributive Justice, 3 HEALTH
MATRIX 195, 196 (1993) (explaining that the reaction to the health care crisis is to begin searching
for scapegoats).
'1d.
"Id. at 197. See Robert Crawford, You Are Dangerous To Your Health, 8 SOCIAL POL'Y
11, 14 (1978) [hereinafter Crawford, Dangerous Health] (describing that the "victim-blaming
ideology will help justify shifting the burden of costs back to users. If you are responsible for your
illness, you should be responsible for your bill as well").
"See Schwartz, supra note 9, at 197.
"Ronald Bayer, Voluntary Health Risks andPublicPolicy, HASTINGS CTR. REP., Oct. 1981,
at 26.
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have focused on proclaiming that individuals who participate in health
diminishing lifestyles ought to be held responsible for their diseases.14
The spectrum of suggestions for the perpetrators of health hazardous
behaviors covers a range of proposals."5 The repercussions can take the
form of complete denial (as in the Great Britain case quoted above), 6
rationing of health care when resources are scarce,17 or assumption of
14See Gerald Dworkin, Taking Risk, Assessing Responsibility, HAS'INGS CT-. REP., OCt.
1981, at 31 (discussing the concerns about responsibility and disease); sce also Schwartz, supra
note 9, at 197-98 (discussing concerns about responsibility and disease). See also Robert M.
Veatch, oluntary Risks to Health: The Ethical Issues, in ETHICAL ISSUES INMODEMN MED. 507,
507-08 (J. Arras & R. Hunt, eds., 2d. ed. 1983) [hereinafter Veatch, VoluntaryRisks] (discussing
that "[a] number ofproposals have been put forth that imply that individuals are in some sense
personally responsible for the state of their health. The town of Alexandria, Va., refuses to hire
smokers as fire fighters, in part because smokers increase the cost of health and disability
insurance .... Additional health fees on health-risk behavior calculated to reimburse the
health care system would redistribute the burden of the cost of such care to those wvho have
chosen to engage-in it. Separating health insurance pools for persons who engage in health-risk
behavior, and requiring them to pay out of pocket the marginal cost of their health care is
another alternative. In some cases the economic cost is not the critical factor, it may be scarce
personnel or equipment. Some behaviors might have to be banned to free the best
neurosurgeons or orthopedic specialists for those who need their services for reasons other than
for injuries suffered from the motorcycle accident or skiing tumble"); see also Robert Veatch,
Who ShouldPayfor Smokers'Medical Care?, HASTWGS CM REP., Nov. 1974, at 8 [hereinafter
Veatch, Who ShouldPay] (describing that "[t]he National Anti-Smokers Protection League has
petitioned DHEW [Department Health, Education and Welfare], claiming that it is unjust for
non-smokers to pay the cost of health care required for smokers as a result of their smoking
(i.e., cancer, emphysema, heart attack), and they propose that a health tax be levied on smoking
materials"); see also John H. Knowles, Responsibility for Health, 198 Sci. 78, 78 (1977)
(describing that the"[p]revention of disease means foresaking the bad habits which many people
enjoy - overeating, too much drinking, taking pills, staying up at night, engaging in
promiscuous sex, driving too fast, and smoking cigarettes - or, put another way, it means doing
things which require special effort - exercising regularly, improving nutrition, going to the
dentist, practicing contraception, ensuring harmonious family life, submitting to screening
examinations"); see also Willard G. Manning, Ph.D., et al., The Taxes of Sin: Do Smokers and
Drinkers Pay Their Way?, 261 JAMA 1604, 1604 (1989) (describing that "[poor health habits,
such as smoking and heavy drinking carry costs not only for smokers and heavy drinkers, but
for everyone else as well. Concern about these costs has prompted not only health-promotion
efforts, but also proposals to increase both federal and state excise taxes on cigarettes and
alcohol"); see also Michael F. Bierer, M.D., MPH & Nancy A. Rigotti, M.D., PublicPahiwyfor
the Control of Tobacco-Related Disease, 76 MED. C.IMCS OFN.A. 515, 524 (1992) (discussing
"Proposition 99, the Tobacco Tax and Health Promotion Act, was passed by citizen referendum
in California in 1988. The law raised the state excise tax on cigarettes by an additional 25 cent per
pack. Revenues raised by the tax, estimated at nearly S600 million per year, go into a Tobacco
Product Surtax Fund").
"IDworkin, supra note 14, at 30-31.
16Dean, supra note 1, at 1525.
'
7 lngrid Kinkopf-Zajac,AssessingPatient Compliance in the Selection ofOrgan Transplant
Recipients, 6 HEALTH MATX 503, 521 (1996).
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costs (including taxing, paying higher insurance premiums, or altering
pre-existing insurance plans).' 8 Certainly the increasing costs of health
care warrant restricting unlimited and wasteful use of resources; 19
however, connecting the individual and responsibility is not the only way
to deal with the health care crisis. In order to find the individual
"responsible" for diseases related to behaviors, two steps must be fulfilled.
First, the individual must be found culpable, which means that the "harm
is in some way the product of some faulty aspect of the person or his or
her conduct." 20 Second, the individual must be found liable, which means
that "certain consequences do or ought to flow from this first judgment
[culpability]." 2 ' This article will examine both steps - culpability and
liability - and will explain why the various justifications for these two
steps are inadequate.
The initial discussion will cover the factors contributing to the
current trend that suggests penalizing individuals for health hazardous
behaviors. Additionally, the current state of insurance and resource
allocation will be evaluated in relation to the health hazardous behaviors.
The two steps will be discussed, finding culpability and liability, and the
downfalls to the differing possible justifications will be analyzed. Then
the potential implications of the systems of liability for health hazardous
behaviors will be discussed and concluded with how the liability for
health hazardous behaviors is not justified.
BACKGROUND
The Reason the Trend of Finding Liability for Health
Damaging Behaviors has Emerged
The initial trend toward patient responsibility for disease was spawned by
the state of health care in the late 1970s. 22 Three crises besieged health
'Schwartz, supra note 9, at 206. Dworkin, supra note 14, at 30-31.
'"See Leonard S. Rubenstein, Ending Discrimination Against Mental Health Trcatncnt in
Publicly Financed Health Care, 40 ST. Louis U. L.J. 315, 358 (1996) (admitting "[h]calth care
coverage will never be all-embracing in a world of finite resources").
2 Dworkin, supra note 14, at 28.
2
id
"See Robert Crawford, Sickness As Sin, 80 HEALTH POL'Y ADVISORY CTR. BULL. 10, 12
(1978) [hereinafter Crawford, Sin] (explaining why this ideology gained popularity at this
"[p]articular historical point can only be understood by examining the growing tensions within the
health care system and the role such an ideological approach will play in resolving them. Most
simply stated, the crises of medicine and health in the late 1970s are three: the crisis of cost, the
(Vol. 2:787
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care at this time: cost, access and medical efficacy.'s First, health care
expenditures were incessantly increasing.24 This directly affected United
States corporations because most health benefits are obtained through
one's employment.25 As a consequence of escalating health care costs,
employers began to examine the monetary outflow for medical care and
concluded that the level was unacceptable.26 Businesses started to search
for cost-effective health care packages for their employees and began to
encourage employees to take responsibility for their health.'
Second, access to health care became a major issue.23 Health care
began to be viewed as an individual right.29 The inability of the
impoverished populations to receive adequate health care became a central
focus. 30 Initially, the escalating costs of health care did not deter the goal
for universal accessibility. 3' The supporters of the campaign did not judge
crisis of access and the crisis of medical efficacy which has begun to focus attention on the social
causation of disease").
23Id.
24Id. at 12-13.
'Mary Ostrer, et al., Insurance and Genetic Testing: MhereAre Pe Now?, 52 SCL 565,56S
(1993). See Crawford, Dangerous Health, supra note 11, at 12 (discussing that in 1975,
General Motors proclaimed that health care costs for their employees exceeded exipenditures
to their primary supplier of metal, U.S. Steel). See also MORRELM,.tsupra note 8, at 8 (describing
a 1984 comparison between U.S. and Japanese autoworkers' hourly wages, which revealed
similar earnings with the exception of fringe benefits. Fringe benefits, the most costly of%,hich
is health care, increased the hourly wage of the U.S. autoworker to S221hr., whereas the wage
of the Japanese autoworker maintained at S13.50/hr.).
'Crawford, Sin, supra note 22, at 13.
"See MoPmIM, supra note 8, at 26 (identifying this push for employee responsibility
Morreim notes that "initially their [businesses'] strategies focused on increasing employeis'
responsibility for health and health care .... Employees' increased responsibility took several
forms. Foremost, they were required to pay higher coinsurance, copayments, and deductibles..
.. Beyond this, firms have encouraged employees to adopt healthier lifestyles by instituting on-
the-job wellness education .... Some corporations have offered financial incentives to shed
pounds, discard cigarettes, buckle seat belts, and reduce drinking habits, while others outright
forbid or substantially restrict their employees' use of tobacco or other unhealthy subztance-.").
'See Crawford, Sin, supra note 22, at 13 (describing that "[t]he late 1960s and early 19703
was the rise in political demands for unhindered access to medical services. Growah reinforced
these demands as did years of propaganda by a medical and research establishment which
promoted medicine in almost religious terms"). See also Friedman supra note 5, at 2491
(discussing the continuing dilemma of access Friedman notes that "[p]robably no health policy
issue of this century (with thepossible exception of insuring and structuring long-term care, which
affects far fewer people) has proven as intractable as access to acute care for Americans who lack
coverage for the cost of that care").
'Crawford, Sin, supra note 22, at 14.
'Old. at 13-14.
311d. at 14
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the cost crisis as problematic in and of itself.32 The escalating medical
costs were viewed as troublesome solely because the costs were a barrier
to availability.33 Eventually, the endeavor for individuals' rights to health
care was supplanted by the reality that accessibility to more people
compounded and perpetuated the problem of escalating costs.
34
Lastly, the medical profession began to realize that there existed a
crisis of social causation.35 The field of medicine that was once touted as
capable of solving all health problems started to acknowledge its own
limitations. 6 Plainly, the abilities of medicine were oversold and there
was a realization that medicine could not solve all health problems.37
Medicine's failure to find cures for plaguing diseases, such as cancer,
increased awareness of environmental and occupational hazards that were
associated with disease. 38 This revelation of medical limitations became
a threat to corporations that were producing the environmental and
occupational hazards. 39  This trend connecting individual and
responsibility surfaced in an attempt to halt the growth of health care
costs, to identify medicine's limits of curing disease, and to divert
attention away from health hazards that corporations had created.40
The Current Health Care System and Penalties:
Insurance and Resource Allocation
The three major forms ofpenalties for health hazardous behaviors include:
denial of health care, rationing of health care when resources are scarce,
321d.
331d. at 13-14.
34See Crawford, Dangerous Health, supra note 11, at 13 (noting the "cost of medical
services and the fiscal crisis are making services more difficult to obtain and are forcing a retreat
from public programs").35Crawford, Sin, supra note 22, at 14.
361d.
371d.
381d.
39Id. See Daniel Wikler, Coercive Measures In Health Promotion: Can TheyBeJustifed?,
6 HEALTH EDUC. MONOGRAPHS 223, 224 (1978) (noting that "[a] crusade against illness-
producing behavior may distract public attention from the need to remove environmental hazards
to good health, such as pollution and unsafe working conditions").40See Crawford, Sin, supra note 22, at 15 (describing that the lifestyle proponents'
emphasis "should not be on overhauling our work or community environments, nor on
changing the structure of work in our capitalist economy; instead, the focus must be on
changing individuals who live and work within those settings .... Further, by focusing on the
individual, victim-blaming assertions perform the classical role of individualist ideologies in
obscuring the class structure of work and workers' lack of control over working conditions").
[Vol. 2:787
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and assumption of costs.4 ' Fortunately, the first type of penalty, which
includes complete denial of health care based on health hazardous
behaviors, has not been documented in the United States. However,
proposals for the second type of penalty suggest that when resources are
scarce, those individuals with health hazardous behaviors should not
receive the same priority as those without health hazardous behaviors.4
Some suggestions place "considerable emphasis" on the individual's
responsibility for health.43 One example of this idea is the allocation of
livers for patients who are alcoholics and need a liver transplantation."
This topic was publicly debated when Mickey Mantle and Larry Hagman
received liver transplants. 41 When rationing expensive life-saving
treatment one way to allocate scarce resources is to consider "persons who
through their own choices increase the cost of care.
' 4 6
The third type of penalty includes forcing the individual to assume
the financial burdens that presumably are caused by the unhealthy
4QDworkin, supra note 14, at 30-3 1. See Schwartz, supra note 9, at 203 (de-cribing the
ways that an individual could bear the burdens of lifestyle choices).
42See Schwartz, supra note 9, at 217 (giving "lower priority to that health care claimant [the
one who partakes in health hazardous behaviors]"). For general discussion of rationing of health
care, see David Orentlicher, Destructuring Disability: Rationing of Health Care and Unfair
Discrimination Against the Sick, 31 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 49 (1996).
"See Robert H. Blank, Regulatory Rationing: A Solution to Health Care Resource
Allocation, 140 U. PA. L. REV. 1573, 1583 (1992) (describing that "[g]iven the large proportion
of health care expended on illnesses that are linked to lifestyle choice, however, any rationing
policy, ifit is to be effective, must place considerable emphasis on the ultimate responsibility of
the individual, not only for his or her own health, but also for reducing the overall costs to
society").
"See Kinkopf-Zajac, supra note 17, at 534 (discussing utilizing alcoholism in an asN .sment
"if the medical outcome was or vill be detrimentally affected'). See also Allen v. Mansour, 631
F. Supp 1232, 1239 (E.D. Mich. 1986) (holding that "the two-year abstinence requirement is
arbitrary and unreasonable" when denying an alcoholic plaintiffa liver transplantation).
"See Henry Silverman, Who Deserves to Get Nen Organs?, THE SuN (BALnIorrE), July
9, 1995, at IF (noting that"[d]ebates about making people suffer the consequences of their
voluntary, unhealthy lifestyle choices recently surfaced when Mickey Mantle received a transplant
to replace his liver, which had been severely compromised by years ofheavy alcohol abuse"). See
also Abigail Traford, Sick Celebrities and Our Comnmon Lot, WVASH. POST, June 20, 1995, atZO6
(pointing out that "Mickey Mantle forces us to confront difficult moral and medical choices in
health care. He symbolizes the role of behavior in getting sick- and in getting better"). See also
Mark D. Somerson, New Transplant Rules for Livers Criticized, COL..BUS DISPAcu, Jan. 20,
1997, at IC (noting that "critics say the new policy punishes alcoholics and people with hepatitis,
and is simply a reaction to criticism the network received after actor Larry Hagnan and the late
Mickey Mantle both got livers").
H. Tristram Engelhardt, Jr., Ph.D., M.D., Shattuck Lecture: Allocating Scarce Mcdical
Resources and the Availability of Organ Transplantation, 311 NE VENG. J. MED. 66, 70 (19S4).
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behaviors. 47 This includes raising insurance premiums and altering pre-
existing insurance plans.4 Insurance companies cover the majority of
health care in the United States. The bulk of the population has health
insurance through a group plan supplied by their employer.49 Employer
health plans are usually either commercial insurance carriers or self-
insured plans." For a commercial insurance carrier, the private insurance
company itself assumes part or all of the financial risks for the company's
employees' health.5' For self-insured plans, the employer assumes all of
the financial risks and responsibility. 2
In all types of insurance plans, underwriting is used as a way of
"classifying people according to risk." 3 "The social purpose of health
insurance is to spread risk across groups, enabling wider access to
services. 5 4 There are three separate types of underwriting: the individual,
the experience-rated, and the community-rated. The individual type of
underwriting assesses one person's risk and premium.5 The experience-
rated underwriting applies to a group and is based on the previous risk to
the entire group.56  The community-rated underwriting addresses a
geographic region's expected risk and loss. 57 Employers traditionally
utilized the second type of underwriting.5
47Veatch, Voluntary Risks, supra note 14, at 508.48Id. Note that taxing will not be dealt with because taxing is beyond the scope of this
paper.
49See M. Susan Ridgely & Howard H. Goldman, Putting the "Failure" ofNational Health
Care Reform in Perspective: Mental Health Benefits and the "Benefit" oflncrementalism, 40 ST.
Louis U. L.J. 407,432 (1996) (discussing that "[a]pproximately 75 percent of insurance coverage
is provided through employers and is paid for by employers and their employees, with public
subsidization through a tax exemption for the employer").
50Ostrer, supra note 25, at 568.
"Eric C. Sohlgren, Group Health Benefits Discrimation Against AIDS Victims: Falling
through the Gaps of Federal Law - ERISA, the Rehabilitation Act and the Americans with
Disabilities Act, 24 LOY. L.A. L. REv. 1247, 1251 n.10 (1991).
'
2Id.
"Gostin, Securing Health, supra note 2, at 38.
'
41d. See John V. Jacobi, The Ends of Health Insurance, 30 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 311,311
(1997) (expressing that "[h]ealth insurance is premised, in part, on notion of mutual aid and social
pooling - the common effort to ameliorate each person's risk of catastrophic medical expense").
SSOstrer, supra note 25, at 566.
56Id.
S7Id.
58Id.
[Vol. 2:787
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Insurance companies are able to utilize an individual's health
hazardous behavior, usually smoking, to raise insurance premiums.59
However, most types of health insurance are sold to groups; therefore,
basing premiums on the individual's health hazardous behavior is
difficult.6" In fact, Bierer and Rigotti point out that "[h]ealth maintenance
organizations must set rates based on community experience and must
petition the Federal Government to use smoking as a criterion for
modification rates. Only about fifteen percent of health insurers selling
individual policies offer discounts to non-smokers, and the average
discount is about ten percent., 61  While only fifteen percent of all
individual policies take into account whether an individual smokes, this
type of penalty is exactly the sort of action that has previously been
suggested.6 2
Even though in some instances the Federal Government becomes
involved in insurance regulation,63 state guidelines and statutes regulate
the majority of the insurance industry.'M Only a few federal laws apply to
insurance regulation because the legislature intended for the states to
monitor this realm. 65 The insurance laws, of course, can vary from state
to state; generally, most states utilize regulation in order to protect
customers and maintain the solvency of insurance companies.(5
Notwithstanding states' guidelines, there is a loophole in the system that
many companies take advantage of in order to bypass certain state laws.67
5 Bierer, supra note 14, at 523. See Ostrer, supra note 25, at 567-70 (discussing that life
insurers offer preferred-risk premiums to individuals who avoid unhealthy behaviors, such a
tobacco use or substance abuse and that saliva tests can be used to detect smoking status).
6
"Bierer, supra note 14, at 525 (discussing the difference of the health insurance m.rket
versus life insurance. "Most private health insurance is sold to groups, not individuals, w'hich
makes it logistically difficult to offer different rates based on individual behavior").
61 d.
62Veatch, Voluntary Risks, supra note 14, at 507-08.
'Bierer, supra note 14, at 525.
'Ridgely & Goldman, supra note 49, at 432 (discussing that "[s]tate government plays the
role of regulator for the private insurance market and payer of care for the uninsured"). Se also
The MeCarran-Ferguson Act of 1945 15 U.S.C §§ 1011-1015(1988). The MeCarran -Ferguson
Act provides that "[t]he business of insurance, and every person engaged therein, shall be subject
to the laws of the several States which related to the regulation or taxation of such business." 15
U.S.C §§ 1012(a) (1988).
'Ostrer, supra note 25, at 571.651d.
6'See Maria O'Brien Hylton, Insurance Classifications After McGann: Ris!: Eficicntly in
the Shadow of the ADA, 47 BAYLOR L. REv. 59, 77-78 (1995) (noting that "ERISA is a
particularly attractive option because ERISA plans are not subject to state insurance mandates").
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The Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA)
creates a loophole by preempting all state regulations of the employer self-
insured insurance plans.68 This is problematic because most guidelines to
safeguard the employee are mandated by state regulation.69 In 1985, the
Supreme Court held that ERISA pre-empts state laws.70 Not surprisingly,
there has been a vast shift from commercial carrier insurance to self-
insured plans; specifically there was a twenty percent increase from 1982
to 1986.7'
The self-funded plans have allowed companies to underwrite
limitations on coverage for human immunodeficiency virus (HIV)-
positive individuals,' which may not be allowable under state law.
However, due to the ERISA preemption, the afflicted individuals cannot
seek protection under the aegis of the state's law.73 The case of McGann
v. H & HMusic Company 4 exemplifies this problem.75 The loophole in
68See Ridgely, supra note 49, at 433 (discussing that "[s]ection 514 of ERISA expressly pre-
empts state law relating to employee benefits"). See also Lizzette Palmer, ERISA Preemption and
its Effects on Capping the Health Benefits oflndividuals with AIDS: A Demonstration of Why the
United States Health and Insurance Systems Require SubstantialReform, 30 HOUS. L. REV. 1347,
1357-59 (1993) (discussing the scope of ERISA).
69See Ridgely, supra note 49, at 433-34 (discussing how state mandates are less effective
because such a large percentage of employers are self-insured and how there is also "significant
concern that without Congressional action on ERISA, state experimentation with large scale health
care reform within their states will be limited, because ERISA hinders state governments' ability
to regulate all employers, especially the large employers').
"°See Sohlgren, supra note 51, at 1267 ("In its first direct affirmation of the distinction
between self-insured and insured employee benefit plans, the Court held that the deemer clause
exempts self-insured ERISA plans from state regulation relating to such plans') (citing FMC Corp
v. Holliday, 111 S. Ct. 403 (1990)).7
'Robert Lowe, Genetic Testing andInsurance: Apocalypse Now?, 40 DRAKE L. REV. 507,
516 (1991). See Ridgely, supra note 49, at 433 (noting that "[a]s of 1984, approximately two-
thirds of all employers who provided health benefits did so through self-insured arrangements")
(citing U.S. CONGRESS OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT MEDICAL TESTING AND HEALTH
INSURANCE, 112-13 (1988)).
'
2Hylton, supra note 67, at 79.
'Sohlgren, supra note 51, at 1251.
4McGann v. H & H Music Co., 946 F.2d 401 (5th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 482
(1992).
7S1d. at 403-05. See Hylton, supra note 67, at 61 ("John McGann's story is a
straightforward one. In 1982 he began working for H & H Music Company and was covered by
the company's group medical care plan. Pursuant to the plan, in effect from August 1, 1987 to
July 31, 1988, all listed coverages were fully insured, up to a lifetime maximum of $1 million.
In December 1987 McGann was diagnosed with AIDS. In March 1988, he met with company
officials and discussed his illness. Four months later, all employees were notified that the medical
care plan was terminated effective August 1, 1988, and that a new group medicalthospitalization
plan would become effective and would limit benefits payable for AIDS-related conditions to a
[Vol. 2:787
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the legal system allowed for an alteration of McGann's health care policy
and the United States Court of Appeals Fifth Circuit found that such a
modification was legal.76 The court held that:
[s]ection 510 does not mandate that if some, or most, or virtually
all catastrophic illnesses are covered, [acquired immune
deficiency] AIDS (or any other particular catastrophic illness)
must be among them. It does not prohibit an employer from
electing not to cover or continue to cover AIDS, while covering or
continuing to cover other catastrophic illnesses, even though the
employer's decision in this respect may stem from some
'prejudice' against AIDS or its victims generally."
In 1992, the Supreme Court denied certiorari and the McGann decision
stands as decided by the Fifth Circuit court.78
While McGann was not specifically denied coverage because of a
health hazardous behavior, this case serves as an example of a stigmatized
disease being denied coverage.79 It is recognized inMcGann that the self-
funded plan was not necessarily separating the individual based on health
hazardous behaviors," because individuals who contracted HIV from
unprotected sex81 as opposed to a blood transfusion would all be treated
equally. Notwithstanding, it is important to note that other non-
stigmatized diseases and other catastrophic illnesses that result in high
lifetime maximum of $5,000. No limitation was placed on any other catastrophic illne. Like
many employers hoping to cut health insurance costs, H & H elected to self-insure under the new
plan').76McGann, 946 F.2d at 408.
771d. at 404-05. See also Hylton, supra note 67, at 62 (discussing the Fifth Circuit's
decision to affirm the "district court's grant of summaryjudgment in the employer's favor on the
ground that the changes McGann complained of were motivated by a desire to 'avoid the exp-.nse
of paying for AIDS treatment.' Because the reduction in AIDS coverage affected all employees
and because there was no evidence that H & H ever promised the S1 million cap would be
permanent, the court of appeals concluded the McGann could not demonstrate either that he wa
entitled to the higher cap or that he was the victim of personal retaliation").
78Greenberg v. H & H Music Co., 113 S. Ct. 482 (1992). Sce Ridgely, supra note49, at432
(noting that to date "the Supreme Court's broad interpretation ofERISA pre-emption has led lower
courts to strike down many state attempts to create new health care financing and delivery
systems"); Cf. Wheeler v. Dynamic Engineering, Inc., 850 F. Supp. 459, 467-63 (ED. Va. 1994)
(holding that "[a]n employer's amendment to its health plan cannot be applied retroactively to
deny coverage for Plaintiff's treatment").
'Palmer, supra note 68, at 1351.
-Hylton, supra note 67, at 66.
"
1Which may be a health hazardous behavior depending on the situation,
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treatment costs (for instance, organ transplantation) were not limited. 2 It
was the stigmatized disease that has historically been associated with
"sinful" behavior that was selectively punished. This case and other
employer caps on insurance do show a selective "singling out" of
individuals with 1IV.8 4 Such segregation is exemplified by suggestions
to protect only those who "innocently" contracted HIV as opposed to
those who are deemed "guilty" for contracting HIV through intravenous
(IV) drug abuse or homosexual activity. 5 If the issue was strictly cost
containment, then other costly illnesses and procedures would have been
similarly restricted like McGann's policy. If individuals who partake in
"voluntary" injurious behaviors become stigmatized as undeserving of
health care or deserving of bearing the burden of costs, it is feasible that
the employer of the self-funded plan may utilize this same loophole
against other diseases related to hazardous behaviors to further enhance
cost containment.
ANALYSIS
The first step to implement proposals to find individuals responsible for
health hazardous behaviors is to assign culpability.8 6 Culpability means
that the product of the health hazardous behaviors is the fault of the
'
2McGann, 946 F.2d at 403.
"
3See Michelle Oberman, Test Wars: Mandatory HIg Testing, Women, and Their Children,
3 U. Cm. L. ScH. ROuNDTABLE 615, 619 (1996) (discussing "it was inevitable that society would
respond to the fearsome HIV epidemic by distinguishing the 'innocent' from the 'guilty' victims").
See also Arthur S. Leonard, Ethical Challenges of HIV Infection In The Workplace, 5 NOTRE
DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y 53, 71 (1990) (explaining that "employers have justified HIV
exclusions as a 'self-inflicted problem' because of its association with IV drug use or promiscuous
sexual behavior").
"
4See Leonard, supra note 83, at 70-71 (explaining that "[h]ealth benefit expenses related
to HIV infection are not necessarily greater than those related to other life-threatening illnesses
normally covered without question by health plans, so singling out HIV infection but not other
conditions for exclusions or caps does not have an objective justification').
'SSee id. at n.68 (describing U.S. Representative William Dannemeyer's proposal to
eliminate "protection for people with infectious disease"; however, exempting those who
"innocently" contracted HIV).
6See Dworkin, supra note 14, at 30 ("To make a claim about the culpability of individuals
for their poor health status claims three things: that the individual was in some way at fault in
behavior, that the faulty behavior produced the lowered health status; that the faultiness of the
behavior created the damage to health"). See also Louis W. Sullivan, M.D., Healthy People 2000,
323 NEwENG. J. MED. 1065, 1066 (1990) (explaining that "[b]etter control of fewer than ten risk
factors... could prevent between 40 and 70 percent of all premature deaths, one-third of all cases
of acute disability, and two-thirds of all cases of chronic disability").
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individual.87 Under culpability there are two major questions-"is there
any relationship between lifestyle and disease?" and "are health hazardous
behaviors voluntary?"
Culpability
Is there a relationship between lifes'le and disease?
Undoubtedly, there is strong support for the idea that behaviors and
lifestyles impact health.8 s Statistical correlations declare that there is an
increased probability for disease related to some behaviors." For
instance, smoking is definitely correlated to a"substantial reduction in life
expectancy" and associated with specific diseases such as, emphysema,
cancer, and coronary artery disease.9' In 1967, a study examining
correlates of death revealed that sixty-seven percent of deaths were "due
to diseases known to be caused or exacerbated by alcohol, tobacco
smoking or overeating, or were due to accidents." 91 Statistics in 1989
comparing smoking to both AIDS and drug abuse revealed smoking
caused 350,000 deaths per year, while AIDS and drug abuse caused
60,000 and 10,000 deaths respectively." Furthermore, there are known
high- risk behaviors that are linked to the exposure and contraction of
HIV.93 Lester Breslow conducted a famous study that examined seven
different personal habits of individuals and correlated them with poor
health, disease, and mortality. He found:
'Dworkin, supra note 14, at 28.
'Lester Breslow, Prospects for Improving Health Through Reducing RTs~t Factors, 7
PRVENTIE MED. 449, 450 (1978).
"
9See Schwartz, supra note 9, at 206 (discussing general risks from behavior, but a direct
link is difficult to establish).
"Frank R. Lemon, M.D., M.P.H., & Jan W. Kuzman, Ph.D., A Biologic Cost ofSno~:mg,
18 ARCHIVES ENVTL HEALTH 950, 950 (1969).
"'Robert M. Sade, M.D., Medical Care As a Right: A Refutation, 2S5 NEW EeG. J. MED.
1288, 1291 (1971).
9"Frank J. Vandall, Reallocating the Costs of SmoUng: The Application of Absolute
Liability to Cigarette Manufacturers, 52 OHIO ST. L. . 405, 405 (1991) (citing Hcaring bhfore
the Subcomm. On Health and the Env't of the Comm. on Encrgv and Commerce, H. Rep., 99th
Cong. 4 (1986); ELIZABETH WHELAN, A SMOKING GUN How THE TOBACCO INDUsTRy GETs
AWAY WITIHMURDER 10 (1984); AIDS, ATLANTAJ. CONsT. Aug. 15, 1989, at A-37; Hearing on
the Health Consequences ofSmoking: NicotineAddiction Before the Subcomm on Health and the
Env't of the Comm. on Energy and Commerce, H. Rep. 100th Cong. 100-68 (1988)).
"Lawrence 0. Gostin, et al., Prevention of HIV/AIDS and Other Blood-Borne Dscsce
Among Injection Drug Users, 277 JAMA 53, 53 (1997) [hereinafter Gostin, Hi1.
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At every age from twenty to seventy, persons in a representative
sample of the adult population who followed all seven of these
habits -- eating moderately, eating regularly, eating breakfast, no
cigarette smoking, moderate orno use of alcohol, at least moderate
exercise, and seven to eighty hours of sleep -- had better health
status than those who followed six. Those who followed six of the
habits enjoyed better health status than those who followed five;
five better than four; four better than three .... The average
physical health of those seventy years of age who reported all of
the good health practices was about the same as those thirty-five
to forty-four who reported fewer than three.'
These statistics are just a few examples extracted from a substantial
amount of literature that cites correlations between disease and lifestyle."5
It would be grossly inaccurate to deny that connections between health
behaviors and disease exist. Notwithstanding the connection, the
information becomes problematic when one tries to reduce the statistics
of a group to represent the idiographic case. The fact is that there is an
increased probability of disease, but not necessarily an absolute cause-
94Breslow, supra note 88, at 450.
95See Arthur J. Barsky, M.D., The Paradox of Health, 318 NEW ENG. J. MED. 414, 415
(1988) (describing gains in combating cardiac disease as attributed to life-style changes); David
S. Bloch &William Robert Nelson Jr., Defining "Health": Three Visions and TheirRanfications,
1 DEPAUL J. HEALTH CARE L. 723,724 (1997) (discussing how "[m]any choices, including organ
donation, choice of diet, and money spent on risky athletic pursuits, impact a person's health");
Nedra B. Belloc, Relationship ofHealth Practices and Mortality, 2 PREVENTIVE MED. 67, 79-S0
(1973) (reporting the results of a study, which show that "for the older age groups there was a
striking inverse correlation between the number of health practices and the mortality level");
Deborah A. Stone, The Resistible Rise ofPreventive Medicine, 11 J. HEALTH POL'Y & L. 671,675
(1986) (describing "elimination of smoking, reduction of alcohol misuse, dietary changes,
exercise, periodic screening for cancer and high blood pressure, and adherence to speed laws and
use of seat belts" as a mode of promoting health through prevention) (citing DEP'T OF HEW
HEALTHY PEOPLE: THE SURGEON GENERAL'S REPORT ON HEALTH PROMOTION AND DISEASE
PREVENTION, DHEW Pub. No. 79-55071 (1979)); OncoLink CancerNews (visited Feb. 19,1999)
<http://oncolink.upenn.edufcancer-newsreuters/1999/feb/cl 02189p.html> (discussing that "eating
tomatoes and tomato-based products is associated with a reduced risk of developing a variety of
cancers"); OncoLink CancerNews (visited Feb. 19,1999) <http://oncolink.upenn.edu/cancer-news
reuters/1999/feb/md02189a.html> (discussing that "[t]he overall advice is don't rush to change
your lifestyle on the basis of any scientific report .... It's far better to adopt a skeptical view, to
wait for a large body of evidence to emerge and then, if it seems warranted to you, to change your
behavior").
[Vol. 2:787
1999] 1NDM DUAL, HAZARDOUS LIFESTYLES, DISEASE & LIABILITY 801
effect relationship. 6 This is illustrated by the fact the not all smokers get
cancer, and not all cancer victims smoke. There is a connection between
lifestyles and disease, but the correlation is based on statistical
probabilities. 97
Are health related lifestyles and behaviors voluntary?
The term "responsible," as it infers to a general relationship between
behavior and disease, based on statistical probabilities, is an accurate and
justified statement. However, the proposals for finding an individual
responsible for disease do not simply imply a correlation. The
suggestions are utilized to encompass more than just a connection; they
infer that the individual is at fault for the disease. 9 Under the aegis of
such proposals, the individual's actions are rendered voluntary and the
person is blamed for the associated negative results." 3
In order to validate assigning responsibility to the individual, it must
be established that the individual could have avoided the hazardous
behavior. Avoidability rests on the notion that there was an absence of
compulsion, namely that the individual could have acted otherwise.' The
notion that the individual has voluntarily chosen the avoidable health-
risky behavior is pivotal to assigning fault. One could not rationally
punish a person who is viewed as lacking the option to do othervise.02
There are two sides of the debate focusing on the voluntariness of
health behaviors, non-voluntary and voluntary. The claim that health
behaviors are non-voluntary is based on theories ofhard determinism and
9 See Schwartz, supra note 9, at 205-06 (clarifying that "[w]hilewe know of the connection
between lack of exercise and heart disease, we also know that hundreds of thousands ofphystcally
fit people die of heart disease each year while hundreds of thousands of the unfit live").97Id.
"See Dworkin, supra note 14, at 28 ("It is to claim that certain judgments or actions are
warranted as a response to some faulty aspect of the person's conduct .... In the case of eal
liability it-will usually be some punishment or civil liability. With respect to moral reponsibility
it will usually be some judgment of wrong-doing or some form of blame, or some duty to mA.e
amends or compensate for injury").
'Id. See Veatch, VoluntaryRisks, supra note 14, at 507 (implying that an individual is to
blame for disease not just that a simple correlation exists).
'O'Dworkin, supra note 14, at 30.
10 See JOEL FEINBERG, REASON & RESPONSIBILITY 411 (1996) [hereinafter FEmmIBmnG,
RESPoNsIBILrY] (discussing that "avoidability is anecessary condition ofresponsibility .... most
of us would agree, my ability to do otherwise is a necessary condition of praise or blame, revyard
or punishment, in short, for my being responsible").
1mId.
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indeterminism. 3 The first non-voluntary theory, hard determinism,
suggests that all actions that occur are not caused by the individual and
will necessarily occur."'J Under the auspices of such a theory, the path of
an individual's life is not chosen, rather it is predetermined and
uncontrollable. 05 This theory does not find that the individual is
responsible for their life path or the consequences. Determinism
extinguishes the individual's responsibility for health-related disease.106
For instance, alcoholism has been touted as genetically inherited, and
therefore, deemed uncontrollable by the individual. 10 7 In addition,
health damaging behaviors, such as smoking, have also been explained
as psychologically determined.'08 Similar to genetic determinism,
psychological determinism absolves the health perpetrator of
responsibility for her illness. Notwithstanding these arguments that
support behavior as determined, the arguments are flawed because
genetic and psychological determinism does not account for the "triggers"
and other associated variables that contribute to the manifestation and
cessation of health hazardous lifestyles. For instance, saying that an
individual is "genetically determined" to be an alcoholic does not account
for the ability of an alcoholic to quit drinking."0 9 If the alcoholic is truly
'
031d. at 410-17. See also A.J. Ayer, Freedom and Necessity, in REASON AND
RESPONSIBILITY 431, 431 (Joel Feinberg ed., 9th ed. 1996) (explaining that "[w]hen I am said to
have done something of my own free will it is implied that I could have acted otherwise; and it is
only when it is believed that I could have acted otherwise that I am held to be morally responsible
for what I have done").
"CFEINBERG, RESPONSIBILITY, supra note 101, at 410.
'O'ld. See also Paul Holbach, The Illusion of Free Will, in REASON AND RESPONSIBILITY
418, 419 (Joel Feinberg ed., 9k" ed. 1996) (discussing hard determinism he notes "[t]he motives
that determine the voluptuary and the debauchee to risk their health, are as powerful, and their
actions are as necessary, as those which decide the wise man to manage his").
'16Robert M. Veatch, The Medical Model: Its Nature & Problems, 1973 HASTINGS CTR,
REP. 59, 65 [hereinafter Veatch, Medical Model].
t07Karen Johnson, Alcoholism and Genetics (visited Nov. 30, 1998)
<http://www.geocities.com/SiliconValley/6366/index.htm>.
... Veatch, Voluntary Risks, supra note 14, at 510 (explaining that "the argument is not
normally based on organic or genetic theories of determinism, but on more psychological theories.
[For instance,] the smoker's personality and even the initial pattern of smoking are developed at
such an early point in life that they could be viewed as beyond voluntary control. If the smoker's
behavior is the result of toilet training rather than rational decision making, then to blame the
smoker for the toilet training seems odd .... Compulsive eating, the sedentary life-style, and
the choice of a high-stress patterns may all be psychologically determined").1091d.
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genetically determined, then she would lack the capacity to act in a
different manner.110
The second non-voluntary theory, indeterminism, suggests that
actions happen randomly by chance."' The individual cannot control
what happens, because everything is a fortuitous event."' Individuals
who contract a major illness are observed as unfortunate, not
necessarily deserving due to behavior and lifestyle choices.
Historically, disease has been considered the cause of pathogens,
"entities, things that invade and are localized in part of the body.
' 13
Illness has been considered a type of deviance" 4 and disease
considered an uncontrollable state that removes the individual's
responsibility."' Under the aegis of this theory, health hazardous
behaviors are not viewed as the cause of disease. Rather the cause
stems from the pathogen that randomly attacks the individual's health.
Indeterminism, like determinism, is flawed. Indeterminism describes
disease as a random occurrence caused by pathogens, which does not
account for the vast literature which links lifestyle to disease." 6 Both
non-voluntary theories-determinism and indeterminism-oversimplify
health behaviors by purporting that disease is completely unrelated to any
human choice. In addition, these theories are contrary to the general
notion of individualism on which society is built."
7
The other side of the debate focuses on behaviors as voluntary. The
two theories supporting this standpoint are libertarianism and soft
determinism." 8 Libertarianism pronounces that the person has free will
and voluntarily chooses her action." 9 This theory purports that human
110FEINBERG, RESPONSIBII;y supra note 101, at 410.
"'Id. at 412.
121d.
13ERIc CASSELL, THE NATURE OF SUFFERING AND THE GOALS OFMEDICIME4 (1991).
t4EIC FREIDsoN, PROFESSION OF MEDICINE: A STUDY OF THE SOCIOLOGY OF ANL.D
KNOWLEDGE 226 (1970) (describing that "the term 'illness,' when used to give meaning to
perceived deviance, implies that what is thought to be deviant does not ari.e through the
deliberate, knowing choice of the actor and that it is essentially beyond his own control').
11Id.
'Breslow, supra note 88, at 450.
.See Veatch, MedicalModel, supra note 106, at66 (discussing that these views oppose the
foundations of liberalism, which is problematic vhen contemplating basing health care palicies
on such theories because of the theories' extreme commitment to non-voluntarism in a society
so heavily imbued vith individualism).
"'FEINBERG, RESPONSIBILITY, supra note 101, at 413-15.
"91d at 413.
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actions are subject to reasoning and are absolutely undetermined.'
Lifestyle choices are viewed as freely chosen with the option of choosing
otherwise and not necessarily related to other factors. In order to justify
adopting the different proposals of individual culpability, one would have
to embrace this theory of behavior. In fact, the tobacco companies have
used this theory to defend against product liability claims.' However,
this model is problematic because it does not account for the influence of
social factors. This theory reduces health behaviors to purely voluntary
choices, thereby excluding any other contributing factors - like
environment, genetics, education, and socio-economic status.
The second voluntary theory, soft determinism, is the combination
of determinism and libertarianism. It posits that determinism is true, but
that it is also congruous with free will and responsibility.'22 This notion
ofbeing determined and still having free will seems incommensurable, but
the two can co-exist.' The term determinism connotes a factual
correlation, not necessarily the individual's powerlessness. '24 The actions
are determined because they can be explained. The individual, however,
is free to choose whether or not to act.' 25 Three factors identify whether
an individual was free to act other than they way she did. A.J. Ayer
explains these factors as follows:
[T]o say that I could have acted otherwise is to say, first, that I
should have acted otherwise if I had so chosen; secondly, that my
action was voluntary in the sense in which the actions, say, of the
kleptomaniac are not; and thirdly, that nobody compelled me to
choose as I did: and these three conditions may very well be
fulfilled. When they are fulfilled, I may be said to have acted
1201d.
'
2 SeeRobert E. Goodin, TheEthics ofSmoking, 99 ETHICS 574,579 (1989) (describing that
"[c]ourts have been as sensitive to this distinction [the voluntariness of action] as moral
philosophers, appealing to the venerable legal maxim, volenti nonfit injuria, to hold that through
their voluntary assumption of the risk smokers have waived any claims against cigarette
manufactures"). Note, however, that the state cannot argue that both the individual and the
tobacco companies are both liable - these two suggestions together are incommensurable.
'22FEINBERG, RESPONSIBILITY, supra note 101, at 413.
"Ayer, supra note 103, at 434-35.
124Id. at 435.
'"Id. at 436.
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freely .... And that my actions should be capable of being
explained is all that is required by the postulate of determinism.'
The difference between soft and hard determinism resides in the capacity
of the individual "to do otherwise."'2 7 Even if the individual's action is
causally determined, this does not obviate the individual from avoiding
the action. Soft determinism most closely resembles the complexity of
health related behaviors. While most individuals are "free" to choose
otherwise, there are many associated factors that causally determine the
lifestyle choice.128 For instance, a person who is addicted to smoking is
"free to choose otherwise"; however, often the physiological need or
addiction precludes the individual from quitting.'29 In this sense, the
smoker is causally determined. What impairs the argument that the
addiction absolutely determines the action, like the hard deterministic
theory, is the fact that individuals freely decide to quit smoking and
succeed. 130  Notwithstanding, the fact remains that it is immensely
difficult for an individual to overcome this physiological barrier and
choose to act otherwise.13 Admittedly, addiction has powerful effects on
the behavior of an individual. Nonetheless, this does not relegate the
individual to a position of a "helpless prisoner of fate."'32
Similarly, strong correlations existbetween socio-economic class and
health related behaviors. 33  In fact, discussion of these correlations
"
2Id. at 435. See FEINBERG, RESPONSmImTY, supra note 101, at 413 (explaining Ayer's
point of view Feinberg notes "according to this theory [soft determinism], if I can do what I
choose, I am free in only the sense of free used in ordinary parlance and in ascriptions of
responsibility, and it matters not whether my choice itself was causally determined").
"'FEINBERG, RESpONsmmnY, supra note 101, at 414.
"Ayer, supra note 103, at 435 (explaining that "[ilt may be said that my childhood
experience, together with certain other events, necessitates my behaving as I do. But all that this
involves is that it is found to be true in general that when people have had certain expariences as
children, they subsequently behave in certain specifiable ways; and my case is just another
instance of this general law. It is in this way indeed that my behaviour is explained. But from the
fact that my behaviour is capable of being explained, in the sense that it can be subsurnd under
some natural law, it does not follow that I am acting under constraint").
"Goodin, supra note 121, at 584.1301d.
"'Robert L. Rabin, Some Thoughts on Smoking Regulation, 43 STANZ. L. REV. 475, 431
(1991).
" 
2Ayer, supra note 103, at 436.
"'Paula M. Lantz, Ph.D., et al., Socioeconomic Factors, Health Behaviors, and MortaliVy
Results From a Nationally Representative Prospective Study of U.S. Adults, 279 JAMA 1703,
1703 (1998).
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suggest that finding the individual responsible for disease distorts the
astronomical contribution socioeconomic status has on disease.'34 Even
if an individual is "free" to choose lifestyle behaviors, the influence of
an individual's social circumstances may causally determine the health
behavior. There have been numerous studies that reveal a strong
correlation between disease and socioeconomic status.135  Socio-
economic status is linked directly to higher rates of contracting HIV. 36
Furthermore, non-smokers are more likely than smokers to have
greater than a high school education. 137 These citations represent a few
select examples of the implications social structure plays in
determining health related lifestyles. Notwithstanding, the literature
does not negate the fact that some individuals, against the odds, are
able to overcome the barriers. 38 Nonetheless, the fact remains that the
134Veatch, Voluntary Risks, supra note 14, at 510.
135See Barbara Starfield, M.D., MPH, Child Health Care and Social Factors. Poverty,
Class, Race, 65 BULL. N.Y. ACAD. MED. 299, 304 (1989) (discussing the correlation between
socioeconomics and disease and noting "there is certainly less evidence for the harmful effects of
cholesterol than there is for the harmful effects of poverty with its relative risks of two to four..
. Illness is a function of predisposing and modifying external forces and host factors. Social
conditions such as low income act through heightened exposure to adverse environmental
conditions, [and] through induced behaviors related to living in deprived circumstances (such as
the inability to afford adequate diets) .... Genetic substrate is explicitly recognized as a factor,
of course, but its expression is modified by other coexisting influences"). See also Patrick W.
Conover, Social Class and Chronic Illness, 3 INT'L J. HEALTH 357, 366 (1973) (discussing low
socioeconomic status and disease). See also CASSELL, supra note 113, at 14 (explaining that "[i]f
the poor have more sickness than the comfortable, if their illnesses are more severe-both well-
known phenomena-then the social setting in which disease occurs must influence its origins,
course, and treatment"). See also MARY MAHOWALD, WOMEN AND CHILDREN IN HEALTH CARE:
AN UNEQUAL MAjoRrrY 220 (1993) (noting that "[s]ocial problems such as unemployment,
underemployment, poor nutrition, teenage pregnancy, drug use, and prostitution all contribute
mightily to the health deficit of the poor").
1'6See Theresa Diaz et al., Socioeconomic Differences Among People with AIDS: Results
from a Multistate Surveillance Project, 10 AM. J. PREVENTIVE MED. 217,217 (1994) (describing
that "[s]ocioeconomic status is an important correlate of behaviors that affect health, health service
access and use, the risk of disease, the risk of an adverse outcome once disease occurs, and
mortality").
'"SeeManning, supra note 14, at 1604 ("[A]ccording to the 1983 National Health Interview
Survey (NHIS), those who never smoke are 1.5 time more likely than current smokers to have
more than ahigh school education"). See Goodin, supra note 121, at 615 (discussing that smoking
is known to correlate "strongly with race and class").
"'See Veatch, Voluntary Risks, supra note 14, at 511 (admitting that "there are disease and
health differentials even within socioeconomic classes and that some element of voluntary choice
of life-style remains that leads to illness').
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vast majority of people cannot prevail over such adversity regardless of
whether they have the "freedom" to do so. 39
Technically many lifestyle choices are considered voluntary because
the person is ultimately free to act otherwise. However, it is exceedingly
apparent from the literature cited that choosing to engage in health
hazardous behaviors is not so simplistic. Referring to health hazardous
behaviors as purely voluntary does not appropriately acknowledge the
plethora of factors that are shown to be causally linked to health behavior.
Sifting out all of the various connectors of health hazardous behaviors is
an arduous task, but clearly these associated factors refute the simplistic
notion of voluntarism.
Despite the justifiable correlation between lifestyle and disease, the
next step of accepting voluntarism, which appoints blame for disease, is
refutable. Notvithstanding, even if one accepts that health behavior is
strictly voluntary this admission only establishes culpability. Therefore,
liability must also be justified prior to execution of the proposals.
Liability
Once an individual is deemed culpable, the next step is to establish
liability, namely "that certain consequences do, or ought to flow from this
first judgment."' 40  Under the liability prong, there needs to be
justification for adopting proposals that penalize individuals for engaging
in behaviors that hurt their health: the six possible justifications are
deterrence, 141 punishment,142 fair distribution of burdens, 14 social utility,"
paternalism, 14' and harm principle.146
Deterrence
One justification for imposing some penalty for a health hazardous
lifestyle is that it will deter the unhealthy behavior. Generally this theory
191d.
140Dworkdn, supra note 14, at 2S.
4 tSchwartz, supra note 9, at 207-09.
i421d. at 209-12.
143Schwartz, supra note 9, at 212-16; Wikler, supra note 39, at 232.
'4"Vikler, supra note 39, at 234.
145Joel Feinberg, LegalPaternalism, 1 CAN. J. PmL. 105,105 (1971) [hereinafter Feinbrg,
Paternalism].
Dan E. Beauchamp, Ph.D., Community: 77e Neglected Tradition ofPublicHcalth, 1985
HASTINGS CTI. REP. 28, 29 [hereinafter Beauchamp, Community].
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posits that "an individual will engage in proscribed conduct as long as the
'perception of the possibility that he... will suffer a sanction' is less than
the 'expected private benefit' provided by that conduct. 1 47 However,
deterrence is not a good justification because it does not tend to work. 48
"Lost health care coverage simply comes too late to be an effective
deterrent, and, as a general matter, its consequences are too insignificant
to add anything to the incentive of good health itself."149 For instance, the
deterrence theory does not work for IV drug users. Not only were needle
exchange programs not found to increase use,"0 but other studies for
addicts found that the hazardous behavior is not deterred by undesirable
consequences.' 5' In fact, some proponents of the needle exchange
program argue that promotion of total health sometimes means accepting
the health hazardous behaviors. 52 For IV drug abusers, not only does the
lack of clean needles not deter the behavior, but denial of clean needles is
not more cost effective than supplying clean needles.15 3 Furthermore,
"
47A. Morgan Cloud, III, Cocaine, Demand, and Addiction: A Study of the Possible
Convergence of Rational Theory and National Policy, 42 VAND. L. REV. 725, 767 (1989).1481d. at 208. See Anne R. Somers & Mary C. Hayden, Rights And Responsibilities In
Prevention, 9 HEALTH EDUC. 37, 38 (1978) (suggesting that "[i]t is futile to try to get individuals
to adopt a healthier lifestyle; societal pressures are too great in the other direction").
.
49Schwartz, supra note 9, at 207.
'S°0 ee Erik Grant Luna, Our Vietnam: TheProhibitionApocalypse, 46 DEPAULL. REV 483,
540 (1997) (discussing that "needle exchange program and general availability of syringes does
not inspire drug use").
'See Cloud, supra note 147, at 767 (discussing that "[m]edical theory and clinical
experience suggest that addicts will pursue and consume cocaine regardless ofdisastrous financial
consequences, as long as supplies remain available. A growing body of information indicates that
cocaine addicts will got to extremes to finance their addictive behaviors").
'See Gostin, HIV, supra note 93, at 59 (explaining that sometimes "[t]he most important
characteristic of the physician-patient relationship is the physician using [his or her] best efforts
and expertise to promote the patient's total health." Suggesting that giving the needles for the
drug users is promoting the patient's total health by preventing transmission of disease).
'
5 See Luna, supra note 150, at 524 (noting that "medical treatment and prevention are much
more economically efficient than criminalization; money spent on treatment is seven times more
likely to stem drug addiction than imprisonment. Further, while it costs a city about $160,000 to
run a needle-exchange program, one syringe-infected AIDS victim will require upwards of
$120,000 per year in public assistance. By preventing only two drug users from contracting HIV,
a needle-exchange program more than covers its costs.") (citing THE WAR ON DRUGS Is LOST,
NAT'L REV., Feb. 12, 1996, at 34 (editorial ofWilliam F. Buckley), THE WAR ON DRUGS IS LOST,
NAT'L REv., Feb. 12, 1996, at 37 (editorial ofKurt Schmoke)).
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deterrence does not work because often the health hazardous behavior is
valued more than the consequences that serve as the deterrent.'5
Punishment
The idea of punishment stems from the notion that these behaviors are
voluntary 5 and deserve penalty for this "free choice." Therefore,
choosing to punish individuals who partake in hazardous lifestyles would
be based on the same justifications as for those individuals who commit
crimes.156 When a crime is committed the perpetrator loses some rights." 7
However, there are some rights that are fundamental, like the right to trial.
Therefore, these basic rights are not relinquished regardless of the
individual's action.5 8 Society must question if health care, like the right
to trial, is a basic right that cannot be relinquished. 9
If society determines that there is no basic right to health care, then
guidelines must be implemented to "police" the health hazardous
lifestyles. These policing guidelines will be difficult to draft for several
reasons. First, the physician-patient relationship would be seriously
compromised if the health care worker was expected to act as a guard of
lifestyle behaviors.' Second, many lifestyle behaviors are strictlyprivate
and could not be easily monitored, for example sexual activity. Third,
14See Cloud, supra note 147, at 770 (explaining that "[i]f addicts do engage in rational
[utility-maximizing] decision making, then they are likely to attribute so much value to consuming
cocaine that the perceived costs will be outweighed by the benefits of consumption").
"See Dworkin, supra note 14, at 31 (explaining that choice is essential to punishment).
See also United States v. Moore, 486 F.2d at 1139, 1240-41 (D.C. Cir.) (en bane) (Wright, J.,
dissenting), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 980 (1973) (discussing blame, free will, and addiction). See
also Richard C. Boldt, The Construction of Responsibility in the Criminal Lai, 140 U. PA. L.
REV. 2245, 2288-94 (1992) (examining the judicial debate about addiction and criminal
punishment).
"
6SeeDworkin,supra note 14, at 31 (discussing that "the jump from culpability to liability
in the area of voluntary health risks will be very much like the one in the area of criminal
punishment. Basic considerations of justice will show that it is not unfair to treat certain
individuals more harshly than others, and the role of choice will be essential to showing this").
t"See Rajendra Persaud, Smokers' Right To Health Care, 21 J. MED. ETHICS 281, 283
(1995) (explaining that "we readily accept that while everyone has a right to liberty, that right is
lost in committing a serious crime").
's5 See id. (suggesting that "however heinous the crime, criminals have a right to trial, and
to certain basic conditions in prison. Might not health be considered such a basic right?").
59 d.
163See Piller v. Kovarsky, 194 N.J. Super. 392, 396 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 19S4)
(commenting that the patient must be able to secure medical services without fear of betrayal and
unwarranted embarrassing and detrimental disclosure).
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because a lifestyle is easy to monitor 6' does not make it the only suspect
behavior. Just as all crimes are illegal so should all hazardous lifestyles
be deemed punishable, not just the ones that are easy to monitor and catch.
For instance, smoking is notoriously considered deserving of penalty and
tends to be easier to monitor than most behaviors; notwithstanding, all
hazardous health behaviors should be equally punished.
Fair Distribution of Burdens
The third justification is based on the notion that it is socially just to
equitably distribute the burdens of costs and resources based on each
individual's lifestyle.'62 The individuals who create the costs from health
hazardous lifestyles proportionately receive burdens based on this
choice. 163 This justification assumes that there are substantial differences
in the costs of care for those engaging in unhealthy lifestyles and those
abstaining from unhealthy lifestyles. This assumption, however, is not
necessarily true.'6 Others suggest that if the objective is to save money,
'
6 1See Veatch, Who Should Pay, supra note 14, at 8 (pronouncing that it is unjust to tax
smoking [for excessive health care costs] because it can be easily done).
6
'See Wikler, supra note 39, at 233 (explaining the principle of fair distribution of burdens
by "[p]eople who take care of themselves, who set health as a high priority and behave
accordingly, may view as unfair any financial burden placed on them by the actions of the self-
destructive. By spreading the cost of curative care to others in their insurance payments pool or
to taxpayers generally, the immoderate is seen as escaping a part of the true costs of his unhealthy
choices").
'"See Schwartz, supra note 9, at 212 (explaining that "[t]hose who choose to live in a way
that requires the expenditure of additional health care resources ought to pay more because they
are getting more"). See also Wikler, supra note 39, at 233 (purporting that "[m]any of us do not
resent being made somewhat poorer so that those in need can be helped. But we might want to
distinguish between deserving and undeserving needs .... The unfairness of making the prudent
pay for the self-destructive person's care...').
''See Howard M. Leichter, Public Policy and the British Experience, HASTINGS CTR. REP.
Oct. 1981, at 38 (suggesting that "[t]he first lesson is that greater health risk avoidance will not
necessarily result in 'mammoth' saving to society') (citing J.H. Knowles, The Responsibility of
the Individual, in DOING BETrER AND FEELING WORSE: HEALTH IN THE UNITED STATES 75 (J.H.
Knowles ed., 1977); Anne L Somers and Mary C. Hayden, Rights and Responsibilities in
Prevention, HEALTH EDUC. 37-38 (1978); T.M. Powledge, No Smoking: New Sanctions for Old
Habits, HASTINGS Cr. REP., Apr. 1978, at 11). See also Persaud, supra note 157, at 284
(suggesting that "[d]octors tend to forget that the medical cost of smoking related diseases can
only be calculated after the costs that would have been incurred had the people killed by smoking
died of something else later, are subtracted ... there is some evidence that there may be no
significant difference between smokers and non-smokers in medical costs to society. Smokers
even save the state money by dying early"). Cf. B.J. Boughton, C'ompulsory Health and Safety
in a Free Society, 10 J. MED. ETmcs 186, 187 (1984) (noting that in Great Britain in 1984 alone,
smoking increased costs to the NHS by 155 million pounds and is identified as the main lifestyle
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then the health perpetrators should be encouraged to smoke because
"smoking tends to cause few problems during ap erson's productive years,
and then kills them before social security and pension payments are
made." 165 In addition, the question arises whether it is socially just to only
select some hazardous lifestyles and not all hazardous behaviors.'
However, if all hazardous lifestyles were chosen, then most people would
be considered health perpetrators.
Social Utility
The fourth justification - social utility- is based on the overall benefit to
society, which is the consequence from a cessation of self-destructive
practices.1 67  The benefit to society is based on economics."' This
justification takes into consideration the direct costs of health care and
indirect costs of illness, such as sick days from work,'69 and unfulfilled
responsibilities to family.70 The social utility argument saves money at
the cost ofthe health perpetrator's liberty.' The question that flows from
the social utility argument is what other personal decisions affect an
individual's health. "Decisions about family planning, choice of career,
type of home cuisine, and where to spend vacations have sizable effects
upon health, and the argument from utility applies equally well to
them."' 2 The social utility argument focuses on economics and because
culprit that increases medical costs). See also Leichter, supra note 164, at 33 (noting that "[in
1975 the costs of smoking-related illnesses alone were said to account for about 10 percent of the
$122 billion U.S. health bill").
1 Persaud, supra note 157, at 284 (citing Daniel Wikler, Persuasion and Coercion for
Health: Ethical Issues in Government Efforts to Change Life Styles, 56 HEALTH A;D So C'Y (now
MmBA TK QUARTERLY) 303-38 (1978)).
t
'See Leonard, supra note 83, at 71 (expressing that "[e]ven if one were to grant employers
the right to allocate health care benefits based on their normative evaluation of the conduct ivhich
led to infection [HIV], one would question why HIV-related claims should be excluded while
illnesses arising from other behaviors, such as smoking, drinking, or poor dietary habits, were not
similarly treated. Exclusion of some 'lifestyle' claims but not others seems based arbitrarily on
employer dislike or disapproval of the people involved, and violates the justice principle by
discriminating in compensation, since some employees would be covered for their lifestyle'
illnesses and others would not, regardless of their contribution to wvorkplace productivity").
'6Wiler, supra note 39, at 234.161See id. (suggesting that "[it is enough for the utilitarian that health promotion provides
society with an opportunity to enjoy significant economic gain and to avoid los").
169id.
"'Robert S. Morison, Rights and Responsibilities: Redressing the Uncasy Balance,
HASTInGS Cm. REP. Apr. 1974, at4 (1974).
"
1 \Vikler, supra note 39, at 235.
172Id.
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of this focus, other liberty choices could equally apply to the goal of
societal economic gain.' 73 If the social utility argument applies to non-
health related behaviors, then the justification for penalizing only the
health hazardous lifestyles fails.
Paternalism
The fifth justification, paternalism, is the liberty limiting principle
established to protect the individual from herself.174 For instance,
proponents of this principle assert that smoking is linked to disease, and
thereby, causes harm to the individual.' 75 This claim is not entirely
correct. The only verified harm to oneself is an increased probability to
disease, not that harm will definitely occur.
John Stuart Mill, probably the most famous adversary ofpaternalism,
adamantly opposed such restrictions on an individual's liberty: "[b]ut
neither one person, nor any number of persons, is warranted in saying to
another human creature of ripe years, that he shall not do with his life for
his own benefit what he chooses to do with it.' '176 Furthermore, Mill
purported that it is more likely that the government would be mistaken
about what is best for the individual than she would. 177 The fact that the
individual is "most interested in his [her] own well-being," makes it more
probable that the individual will do a better job at deciding what is in her
"See id. at 235-36 ("We will be in a better position to see if the utilitarian argument stands
on its own if we focus on behaviors which are neutral with respect to these extraneous attitudes
.... The utilitarian argument, we must recall, targets these decisions for change not primarily
because of their effects on health, but because of the effects of ill health on the economy and the
public welfare generally. The argument applies to any decision affecting the general good; it does
not require that these economic effects be mediated by illness. One familiar argument for strong
anti-smoking programs is the cost to society of lost work days due to smoking-related disability.
The same sort of loss occurs when a person who could be very productive in one profession
chooses another instead which requires talents he lacks; or when someone decides simply to work
less and accept a lower income.... The success of the utilitarian argument for coercive life-style
reform, then, depends on being able to furnish a moral principle which [sic] distinguishes these
basic freedoms from others which are not basic. Such a criterion would serve to show, perhaps,
that choice of domicile, family size, or career are protected by right, while the liberties to smoke
or eat large quantities of red meat may be withdrawn at society's convenience. Unfortunately,
moral philosophy has not provided such criterion to date").
'
74See Feinberg, Paternalism, supra note 145, at 105 (explaining "[t]he principle of legal
paternalism justifies state coercion to protect individuals from self-inflicted harm, or in its extreme
version, to guide them, whether they like it or not, toward their own good'). For comments on
public health paternalism see infra notes 187-88.
"
5Goodin, supra note 121, at 579.
176JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY 71 (David Spitz, ed., 1775).177Id.
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best interests. 178 The courts have found that the right to self-determination
is firmly based in the Constitution. 79 These autonomous decisions,
regardless if deemed senseless, are to be respected.12' These established
rights of self-determination for health decisions do extend to health
hazardous lifestyles.18'
Mill's argument is convincing. However, it is not relevant to the
debate about health hazardous behavior. After closer examination of
several paternalistic proposals to penalize perilous health behaviors, a
discrepancy surfaced between what was touted as apaternalistic intent and
what was the actual intent of the restriction. For instance, many
restrictions justified under the auspices of harm to the smoker are actually
proposed with the plan of decreasing health care costs and minimizing the
economic harm to the community. If the aim of the proposal is to have
positive effects on society, than the proposal's design is clearly not
intended to protect the individual from harm to herself. Instead, the
proposal is meant to protect the community from harm."s The intent of
1781d.
179See Bruce J. Winick, On Autonomy: Legal and Psychological Pcrspctir-cs, 37 VIL. L.
REv. 1705, 1732-33 (1992) (explaining that "[like other constitutionally protected autonomy
rights, the right to self-determination in matters of personal health is deeply rooted in our
constitutional traditions. The right is an outgrowth of the 'historic liberty interest' in 'pzrsonal
security' and bodily integrity").
"°Id. at 1735 (discussing that "[u]nless incompetent, the patient's medical decisions must
be respected, no matter how foolish these decisions are thought to be").
...See Blank, supra note 43, at 1577 (noting that "Americans depend heavily on the liberal
tradition and emphasize individual autonomy, self-determination, and a shared belief in the value
of the individual; individuals ought to be free to determine their preferred lifestyle and then, as
long as they do not directly harm others, to live it, even if it is self-destructive. Within this value
context, even the suggestion that individuals have a responsibility to live a healthy life for their
own good and that of the community is attacked as "victim blaming" or"blatant patemalism" and
contrary to individual choice. The shift in the burden of disease, from infectious dizeases that
required major societal efforts to control toward diseases linked to individual behavior, prezents
a serious challenge to this value of lifestyle choice, however"). See also Boughton, supra note
164, at 189 (commenting that "[c]ompulsory health and safety is a very dangerous notion vwhich
may only be justifiable when the public health interest and not its economic interest is at stake.
Sickness and death come to both the fit and the frail eventually, and few would cdmire the
obsessive pursuit of fitness and health .... A health service based on personal culpability is
neither a sound nor a Christian ideal, but the gradual erosion of individual freedom, by a State
which finds itself increasingly unable to keep pace with the cost of modem medicine, is no less
a grim prospect").
"See Tom L. Beauchamp, Ph.D., The Regulation of Hazards and Hazardous Bchaviors,
6 HEALTHEDUC. MONOGRAPHS 242,246 (1978) [hereinafter Beauchamp, Rcgulation] (addresing
this flawed paternalistic argument, "[i]t is doubtful that strong paternalism helps resolve
controversial health policy questions. Moreover, paternalism in any of its forms should prove
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patient liability for disease is not to protect the individual from harm to
herself, therefore a paternalistic justification is not warranted.
Harm Principle
The last justification, preventing harm to other individuals, is the only
liberty limiting proposal thathas been relatively agreed upon. 83 However,
what actually constitutes harm is not readily apparent, and the definition
allows considerable room for disagreement. Harm is defined as "the
violation of an [other's] interest" and an interest is something in which
one has a stake.'84 The intention of this constricted definition was to
exclude sweeping claims of harm to society as a whole or vague non-
perceptible individual claims. 185 However, there are no generalized duties
that health violators owe to the public.' 86 The notion of the harm principle
would not be applicable to the claim of harm to the community. In fact,
individual differences in society should be valued even if, ostensibly, the
differences are unfavorable.8 7  Possibly a few limited exceptions to the
harm principle exist, which are related to public health.' 88 However, the
largely irrelevant to public health measures... health educators may regard themselves asj ustified
in influencing policy makers to enact laws to control smoking, alcohol, fluoridated water,
insurance rates, and other health-related matters not because they are thereby protecting people
against themselves, but rather because such practices harm the health of other persons, cost society
too much money, potentially can protect the health of many persons, tend to disrupt families, etc").
'
83See MILL, supra note 176, at 10-11 (expressing "the only purpose for which power can
be rightfully exercised over any member of a civilised [sic] community, against his will, is to
prevent harm to others").
"
8 4JOEL FEINBERG, RIGHTS, JUSTICE, AND THE BOUNDS OF LIBERTY 71 (1980) [hereinafter
FEINBERG, BOuNDs OF LIBERTY].
'.See, MILL, supra note 176, at 76 ( clarifying "with regard to the merely contingent, or as
it may be called, constructive injury which a person causes to society, by conduct which neither
violates any specific duty to the public, nor occasions perceptible hurt to any assignable individual
except himself; the inconvenience is one which society can afford to bear, for the sake of the
greater good of human freedom").
'
86See Dworkin, supra note 14, at 27 (discussing role-responsibility he notes there must be
a "place in social life, which carries with it certain duties and/or obligations."). Cf. MILL, supra
note 176, at 76 (discussing the differences of duty owed to society of a general person and that of
a soldier or a policeman).
"'See, MILL, supra note 176, at 91 (expressing that "[individuality] will do so [stand its
ground] with increasing difficulty, unless the intelligent part of the public can be made to feel its
[individuality's] value - to see that it [individuality] is good there should be differences, even
though not for the better, even though, as it may appear to them, some should be for the worse").
.'See Winick, supra note 179, at 1733 (discussing that "the state's police power interest in
protecting the public health from the spread of a highly contagious disease justified interference
in what otherwise would be an area preserved by the Constitution for individual self-
determination"). See also Beauchamp, Community, supra note 146, at 33 (discussing public health
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harm the health perpetrator creates is mainly economic and the focus of
public health paternalism is often to prevent the spread of contagious
disease."i 9
IMPACT
As the health care crisis persists, so will the suggestions to shift costs to
the individual who partakes in health hazardous lifestyles.' The
proposals to punish the health violators for actions deemed voluntary
are refutable. While the action may be designated as voluntary or
avoidable, it has been shown that social structure and other factors 9'
causally determine health behavior. 9 Most, not all, individuals never
overcome these insurmountable factors. Therefore, much of what the
ideology of disease responsibility accomplishes is blaming the
victim.'93 Health perpetrators are touted as "free" to do otherwise;
however, they are not given access to resources or education to prevent
paternalism of fluoridation of water and wearing ofmotorcycle helmets). Sce also Persaud, supra
note 157, at 281 (discussing that health care is not denied ifan individual does not wear a seatb elt).
'"'Vinick, supra note 179, at 1733.
1'See Blank, supra note 43, at 1583 (explaining that "in an era of increasingly scarce
resources where medical goods and services are rationed, the debate vill intensify over the extent
to which individual behavior ought to influence rationing decisions").
"'See Goodin, supra note 121, at 584 (discussing the impact of addiction and advertsing
on smoking).
"See Dan E. Beauchamp, Ph.D., Alcoholism As BlamingtheAlcoholic, 11 IT'LJ. OF1THE
ADDICTIONS 41, 42 (1976) [hereinafter Beauchamp, Alcoholism] (discussing that "[v]ictim-
blaming results from defining social problems in terms of the behavioral failures of the victims of
that problem. For example, Moynihan (1965) defined Black poverty as a behavioral inability.
Blacks were said to be unable to strive for long-term goals such as education and stable
employment. The weakness of the Black family-the absent father, the dominance of the
mother-was seen as the root cause of this inability. As Ryan points out, the implication is that
if it weren't for this incapacity, the Black could find his place in society. But-as he says-this
conclusion will be hard to accept by those with any insight into the pervasive mechanisms of
racism and social inequality. It is likely that collective measures against the:e
inequalities-measures that could affect all members of society-will be needed").
"'Crawford, Sin, supra note 22, at 10. See also Beauchamp, Alcoholism, supra note 192,
at 43 (explaining that "[t]he heart of victim-blaming is the attempt to explain social problems in
terms of the behavior of those who experience the problem. This explanation is always in terms
of how this behavior is different from the behavior of the nonproblem group. A principal way in
which these differences between the nonproblem majority and the problem minority are stated is
in terms of ability or capacity. The majority has some capacity which prevents them from
becoming mentally ill, committing crime, becoming poor, etc. The minority, on the other hand,
lacks these properties. Hence the task for explanation of a social problem becomzs that of
explaining the origins of this lack of capacity for the minority").
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the hazardous behaviors." 4 The expectation of individuals to cease
perilous health lifestyles should be reciprocated by availability of
resources to achieve that goal.'95 Without resources, the proclamation
of "individual responsibility for health" becomes meaningless and
unattainable.
This victim-blaming ideology will have a disproportionate effect
on the marginalized groups -- specifically, those who are uneducated
and fall in the lower socio-economic status. Numerous studies have
targeted income and education as inversely related to mortality
outcomes 96 and directly related to health risk behaviors.'97 In fact,
individuals in the lower socio-economic status have "a significantly
higher prevalence of health risk behaviors."'98 These individuals who
will be blamed for their health hazardous behaviors are exactly the
same individuals who already have a problem receiving adequate
access to health care. Thus, blaming those individuals will further
isolate them from the health care system. These health perpetrators,
even if educated on how to improve their health behaviors, will still
have to contend with the other wide range of factors that cause this
group to partake in hazardous behaviors.' 99 These factors include:
differences in exposure to occupational and environmental hazards,
unequal access to health care, and the social force in the socio-
economic stratification. 0
0
[T]he problem of lifestyle and mortality is not just one of
inadequate education or income, and the problem of socio-
economic differentials in mortality is not just a problem of
lifestyle choices. We must look to a broader range of
1
'See Redford B. Williams, M.D., Lower Socioeconomic Status and Increased Mortality:
Early Childhood Roots and the Potential for Successful Interventions, 279 JAMA 1745, 1745
(1998) (discussing that "[i]nstead of simply targeting risky health behaviors, any effective
intervention to ameliorate the impact of lower SES [socioeconomic status] on health and disease
will need also to reduce hostility, depression, and social isolation-and perhaps correct autonomic
imbalance as well").
.
9 Knowles, supra note 14, at 78.
196Lantz, supra note 133, at 1703.
.
97id. at 1706.
198Id.
"9Id. at 1707-08.200Id. at 1707.
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explanatory risk factors, including structural elements of
inequality in our society.2"'
Without consideration of the construction of society, including
occupational and environmental hazards, the broader picture of all the
factors that contribute to disease is missed. By isolating the individual,
other disease-causing factors remain blameless and overlooked.
Incentives to change these occupational and environmental factors are
reduced when the individual shoulders the blame for disease. By
solely focusing on the individual the complexity of disease causation
is minimized. Overall, shifting the focus away from these other causal
factors does not work to the advantage of society. In fact, this could
hurt individuals who will develop disease due to either occupational or
environmental factors. Due to the diverted attention, the other causal
factors do not receive their due blame and as a result these harmful
contributions are never acknowledged or rectified. Instead of
suggesting that distribution of burdens related to health hazardous
behaviors is "just," what might be more "just" is breaking down the
protection of the most powerful organizations in society and
controlling the hazards they create. 02
Victim-blaming currently serves the purpose of reducing and
denying costly health care during a medical cost crisis. As indicated
in the first section, which elucidated the reason for the surfacing trend
of individual culpability, economics plays a primary role in suggesting
an individual's accountability for harmful health behaviors. Victim-
blaming allows for a continued disregard of the effects of social
implications on health behaviors. Instead of altering the social
structure to accommodate the individual's needs and to promote better
health, the individual is identified as the problem thus justifying the
shift of costs and responsibility to the health violator.23
2°antz, supra note 133, at 1708.
2
'See Dan E. Beauchamp, Public Health as Social Justice, in ETIcAI ISS UESI N MODErvW
MEDICINE 516 (John Arras and Robert Hunt eds., 2nd ed., 1983) (suggesting the issue ofjustice
should focus on restructuring of society having the most powerful and numerous accept new
burdens on behalf of the least powerful or the least numerous).21Crawford, Sin, supra note 22, at 15.
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CONCLUSION
In summary, it is not warranted to accept the proposals of patient
responsibility associated with lifestyle choices. Unless these
suggestions can justify the claims of both individual culpability and
liability, this victim-blaming ideology should be abandoned. Instead
of denying health care to these health violators, more education and
accessibility to resources should be provided before placing
responsibility for an individual's disease. The transaction costs for
allowing punishment of health deleterious behaviors far outweighs the
benefits. The proponents of the proposals need to consider the
aftermath that would be created by such health policies:
[A] health care system that has become too selective in terms of
whom it treats carries with it the seed of its own destruction. Our
system has been built ... on a tradition of pluralism ... and
voluntary giving; a tradition of faith, hope, and charity. Should
the public lose faith in that arrangement.., the very basis of the
heath care system is in jeopardy.20 4
In the tradition of pluralism, society must realize that individuals
weigh the costs of health hazardous behaviors against the possibility
of disease differently-not every person values a decreased risk of
disease over smoking, drinking, overeating, or sedentary lifestyle.
2'Friedman, supra note 5, at 2495.
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